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[自由之鹰] 螺旋桨击落喷气式

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发表于 2008-7-3 10:07:38 | 显示全部楼层 |阅读模式
空军二级战斗英雄王天保访谈录
  
  王天保,河南陕县人,1926年生,1940年参加革命,参加抗美援朝时为志愿军空军飞行大队副大队长,击落击伤敌机四架,空军二级战斗英雄,退休前任海军航空兵顾问。
  
  王天保:抗美援朝开始的时候,我们正在上海担任防空任务。那时候,和我们一起学飞行的同学,还有派去学飞行的同学都去参加抗美援朝了,就是我们飞拉-11的部队没有去。我们心里那个急呀,都一个心情,就是希望能够参加抗美援朝,我们一再向上级请战,要求去参加抗美援朝。
  当然,我们也知道,那个时候,朝鲜战场上主要是喷气式飞机作战,我们是拉-11,是螺旋桨飞机,比喷气式飞机落后,但是我们对拉-11飞机还是蛮有信心。
  拉-11是一种什么样的飞机?
  王天保:拉-11飞机是苏联生产的一种螺旋桨飞机,跟喷气式飞机相比,虽然速度小一些,但是它性能非常好,机动性很好,非常灵活。
  拉-11飞机是什么时候生产出来的?然后在苏联装备部队的呢?
  王天保:拉-11飞机是苏联在二次世界大战快要结束的时候生产的,大概在1945年左右装备部队。这个飞机没有参加过第二次世界大战,参加二次世界大战是拉-5、拉-7,最后是拉-9。这个系列的飞机在第二次世界大战中是立过大功的。我们开始在航校学飞行,飞的就是拉-9,拉-9的航程短,灵活性好,但是它没有拉-11强度大。所以,拉-11飞机在二次世界大战结束以后还是很好的飞机,但是发展到喷气式飞机时代,它就落后一点了。
  我们当时就专门研究用螺旋桨飞机对付喷气式飞机的办法。遇到喷气式飞机怎么办?我们当时的办法就是,只要能看见敌人,我们就有信心,至少是不会被敌人打下来。因为喷气式飞机速度快,我们速度慢,它要是打我们,我们就有办法打它们。当然它要跑我们追不上,但是只要是它来打我们,我们就有办法,办法是什么呢?当时的飞机没有导弹,就是枪炮,看谁先射击,只要我们能看到敌人,就能打它,要抢占先机。碰到敌人有几种可能,一个是打对头,对头相对速度很大,要打大家都很困难,我们拉-11更不怕了,我们速度慢,瞄准射击更有利。
  如果从后方来的话,主要是一个办法,它从后方来,远距离的时候,利用我们飞机灵活性,我们急转弯和它打对头和斜对头,等它擦过来的时候,我们扣过来打它。敌人离我们比较近的时候,发现距离比较近了,这个是时候我们就利用侧滑动作,就是利用急剧的侧滑,破坏他的瞄准。因为枪炮要射击,它的瞄准必须构成一个角,它瞄我前面,我飞机这么走,枪炮全部打到一边去了。等它靠近我们,它速度大,冲过我们的时候,我们扣过来,反而能打它。这个办法是它越近的时候,我看它要攻击我了,我就是一侧,等它冲出去以后,我们扣过来了,它往前,它速度越大,它刚通过我们的时候,离我们距离并不远,所以这样我们扣过来打他,当时对付它主要是这个办法。所以说,打对头也好,打后头也好,打几头,我们都不怕它。所有这些东西,我们正好在朝鲜战场上用上了。
  当时不让你们拉-11参战,主要是因这种飞机比较落后吗?
  王天保:在朝鲜战场上打空战,主要是喷气式飞机,专门由拉-11单独作战就追不上人家,所以拉-11飞机用途主要还是掩护轰炸机炸敌人,这是最主要的用途。
  你们是什么时候接到上前线命令的?
  王天保:在上海防空的时候,我们就写了很多申请,一再要求去参加抗美援朝,上级答复我们,有你们打的,但是具体时间没讲。到了1951年,参加国庆检阅,我们团参加空中梯队,接受毛主席检阅,通过天安门。在国庆检阅时,空中梯队最前面有一个轰炸机,那是八师师长吴凯飞的领航机,旁边掩护的小飞机就是我们团的,我没有飞,当时我在唐山机场组织飞行。参加完国庆检阅以后,我们就参加抗美援朝了,到了前线。
  您去时已经有部队在朝鲜战场参战了吧?
  王天保:四师有,三师也有。
  他们参加战斗的战报你们是不是都能看到?
  王天保:情况我们都知道,前方部队打仗的情况,我们部队经常传达,都知道。所以我们一再要求去参加抗美援朝,现在真正要参加抗美援朝当然非常高兴了。第一次去,刚到那里条件很差,睡觉都是集体睡,大通铺,但是大家很高兴。我们团是四团,我们这个团有着光荣的历史,虽然时间不是很长,但是我们参加了好多大的一些活动。比如像全国渡河演习,我们在1951年的时候就参加了。当时首长讲话的中间,说我们团是“四大金刚”之一,所以大家都很自豪。
  正式开始参加战斗是什么时候?
  王天保:我参加的第一次正式打仗就是打大和岛,这是我们空军第二次轰炸大和岛了。第一次参加轰炸大和岛是我们团一、二大队去的。因为当时一有任务,我们全团都要去,可是,一次只准去两个大队,那时候两个大队十六架飞机,一个大队八架飞机,大家都要求去,团里领导就公开讲,咱们轮着来,按次序来。按照编制,一大队、二大队在前,去两个大队就是一大队二大队,下一次再去的时候就是三大队,一大队,所以这次轰炸小和岛,轮到我们三大队了,在我们后面的那个大队是一大队。第一次轰炸的时候,敌人毫无准备,我们打得很突然,所以打得很好,大家很高兴。第二次轮到我们了,动员的时候,上面就讲了,大家不是要求打仗嘛,这回你们肯定会和敌人相遇的!大家很高兴,为什么?头一次去执行任务完成得很好。但是没有和敌人见上面,没能够和敌人真正地较量,是个遗憾。这次领导考虑到,因为第一次敌人吃了亏,这一次很可能拦截,说这回你们肯定要和敌人见面的。
  所以,我们准备得很充分,当时我们反复设想遇到敌人喷气式飞机怎么办?正好采用我们平时训练、事先考虑很成熟的动作。这次轰炸大和岛,我们担任轰炸机的直接掩护任务,叫直接掩护队,我是三大队长副大队长,带四架飞机,钱华刚同志带一个中队,在轰炸机最前面第一个中队的两侧,我飞在轰炸机右边。
  你们的编队离轰炸机有多远?
  王天保:我们与轰炸机间隔四百米,我们飞机之间的距离是五百米,考虑到敌人攻击的时候我们作拦截动作,这样的距离正好能够机动开。我们的后面是机动大队,团长带队,在我们后上方。
  起飞顺利不顺利?
  王天保:当时起飞,我们事先做好了准备,就是规定了集合点,集合点就是铁路线,我们沿铁路北上,向北偏西,轰炸机沿铁路,在铁路的西面,向南偏东方向飞。因为条件比较差,机场是土跑道,拉-11飞机的座舱不密封,前面双机起飞后,后面双机间隔太小,不行,土跑道机场灰尘太大,看不见,稍微过一下,拉的距离就比较长。我们起飞以后,自己集合上了,就去和轰炸机汇合,向汇合点飞。
  这时,我考虑到,要早早做好准备,防止到时候突然遇到情况来不及,所以我当时就做了准备。因为是冬天,很冷,我们都戴了线手套,我就怕作战的时候,戴上手套不敏感,影响我做动作。所以我把线手套脱下来。座舱上,因为起飞时候灰大,积了不少灰尘,前面一起飞,后面飞机就吃亏。我把座舱玻璃擦擦干净,怕影响视线,这是我准备作战的一个动作。我的肩带,两个肩带本来是拉得很紧的,因为飞机在飞行过程中,可能产生负荷,如果肩带不拉紧,人就会从座位上浮起来,就没法操纵飞机。不过,肩带太紧,就会把人箍得很死,转头都很不方便,想看后面都看不到。所以我把肩带放松了,放松以后,转身就方便,这样就可以看见后方,两边都能看到,这是我做的第二个准备。第三个准备呢,拉-11这种飞机,它的炮弹不是用电按钮“上膛”,它是用把手“上膛”,拉一下,“啪”,放手,一个炮上膛,再拉一下,第二门炮上膛,三个炮要拉三下,虽然时间不长,但还是需要时间,我就考虑,早早做好准备,一定都做得非常充分,一旦突然有情况,不会误事。于是,我就早早把三门炮的炮弹都上了膛。按要求应该是飞机出海的时候炮上膛,我想我小心一点就是了,反正我不要走火,我就把炮弹上膛,一切都准备好。正好集合的时候,轰炸机却提前起飞到了集合点,我们就和轰炸机错过了,因为两个对头走,它提前到了,我们就落后了,就这样错过了。我搜索的时候,我一看,这个太阳光底下,上面太阳,太阳光底下几个小黑点,很远的,我就喊,我说:“发现了,在我们右边,已经过去了!”我喊跟我来,眼睛盯住目标不敢放开,一放开怕丢了,我就一直盯着它,一直追,等追上的时候,已经到了海边了,我们的队形还没有完全编好,没有完完全全恢复正常的时候,就已经到前线了,一到了海边以后才发现,我们丹东机场的喷气式飞机、也就是米格-15正在起飞,他们还是担任间接掩护任务的,讲好了,在空域里面,他们在上空掩护我们,我们直接掩护轰炸机。结果,轰炸机到早了,我们到晚了,喷气飞机当时正在起飞,还没有完全到达空域,实际上也晚了。
  这时候突然间发现,在我们左前方一片飞机过来了,我当时一看,一片白花花的飞机,只一眼我就看到了四、五架,有人报告说发现敌人,有的说是不是我们的飞机?还含糊不清。那飞机过来的时候,我在轰炸机旁边,它过来的时候,一拉上来,一下子俯冲下来了。是敌机嘛!过来就向我们的轰炸机发动攻击了,我马上拉过来,一个急转弯拉起来,咚一下,打了个点射,咚一下,就是这个姿势,打敌人前方,打打点射,拉起来,紧接着后面又来一个,我这边拉一个,那边又拉一个,那边又过来了,好几次。有一次,我这么一拉过来,正要回去,回轰炸机那边,我一看,这个飞机正好对着我,我一转一看,啊哟,还不是一架,而是七架,因为我当时肩带很松,我一转身一看,我后面没有,在我的斜后面正在向我转,前面这一片我看到了,没办法,我就不能回去了,敌人对着我了。我一拉过来,对着前面——因为拉-11飞机,虽然速度小,只有七百公里速度,敌人有一千多公里,但是拉-11机动性非常好,我们做一个标准情况下的转弯的话,盘旋一个三百六十度,只要二十一秒钟,很快,转弯加速度很大,所以我当时很快地转过来,对着前面的飞机打。哒哒,一打,曳光弹的弹道看得很清楚,三门炮三个点,看见炮弹通过敌人的飞机了,敌人的飞机呢,一转弯,一下子没有了。为什么?因为它一翻的时候,我的飞机肚子就把它盖住了,一翻看不见了,我看看后面,后面还继续向我转。他没瞄准我的话,我转得比它快,它就没有办法打,我就瞄准前面打,和刚才一样,我一打,一翻又跑了,后面还继续跟我转,也还跟不上。我就这么一架一架打。当时也没有记清楚打了几架,打到后面,我一看,后面没有了,前面飞机还继续转,我当时心情很着急,打了几架?怎么一打一转,到底打得怎么样?不清楚,也没法看,飞机一下子盖住了,也来不及看,最后一架飞机,我想打狠一点,我用了三门炮,那时候的炮弹速度慢一点,但是一秒钟一门炮是九发,三门炮一秒钟是三九二十七发。我就瞄了后面一个飞机,我瞄准了狠狠地打了一下,这回来了一个长射。空战中间有一个点射、短射、长射,正常射击是不到一秒钟,我打了一秒多一点,就是打了三十、四十发,一打完了以后,看见了炮弹的火网,呼呼地把飞机罩住了,接着发现飞机座舱后面机翼上轰地一下,冒出一个东西,当时冒的是什么东西我来不及看,紧接着我的飞机“哒哒”抖得很厉害,我就下意识地认为我光在瞄前面去了,可能是后面有飞机来向我攻击,是不是我受伤了?打得我的飞机抖啊?因为我们事先在战斗时都研究了,发现敌人攻击,一旦打上你的时候,马上采取大动作的侧滑动作。
  所以我就“哗”一侧,一侧以后,我转身一看,没有敌人,那就是我进入它的气流了,我一转身就找轰炸机,因为我们的任务就是掩护轰炸机,以轰炸机的胜利为胜利。一转身以后,轰炸机就在前面不远了,因为我们这个圈打得很急,油门都放在最大的。紧接着,轰炸机就投弹了,当时看到轰炸机也受到不小的损失,当时我们的心里很激动,他们是冒着烟把炸弹投向敌人。这时,轰炸机零零星星回来了。我们编队,然后掩护轰炸机回到了安东、也就是现在的丹东机场,轰炸机落地以后我们就返回去了。

--未完--  
(声明:非转贴自DOF)
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 楼主| 发表于 2008-7-3 10:08:21 | 显示全部楼层
落地以后,我发现我的飞机机翼腹部坏了一块,不知是不是炮弹打的,一个大口子。
  当时您打的美国飞机是什么型号的?
  王天保:F-86,在当时,它是最好的飞机,在美国也是最先进的,使用时间不是很长。它的飞机速度可以到一千到一千一百公里,我们的飞机速度是七百公里。比较起来,我们的飞机当然要差了。
  这仗打下来以后,经过判读,您打下几架敌机?
  王天保:判读时认定,我前面开炮都是击中了,算击伤,后面一架,我看飞机冒烟,冒出个东西,也不知道是什么东西,算击落一架,击伤三架。
  据你所知,苏联人有没有用拉-11这种飞机做过战?
  王天保:没有。
  用这种螺旋桨飞机打喷气飞机,这是头一回?
  王天保:应该是吧。以前没听说过,以后也不会有了。
  那么可以这样说,您是头一个用拉-11这种螺旋桨飞机击落喷气式飞机的人啦?
  王天保:嗯。
  现在回过头来想,这次掩护轰炸机执行任务,有什么经验教训吗?
  王天保:经验教训是有的。首先,轰炸机提前了以后,掩护部队没有完全集合好,没有恢复好队形就出去战斗了,这是一个必须吸取的教训。第二呢,因为前面我们第一次轰炸大和岛的时候很成功,第二次再去轰炸就要考虑到敌人也会接受教训的。而且,我们的时间正好也是下午三、四点钟的时间。起飞集合用的是短波无线电,没有超短波。短波无线电联系很频繁,轰炸机和歼击机的联系很频繁,敌人已经发现我们要去炸它了,因此,它早做好准备了。而我们呢,因为轰炸机提前了,我们间接掩护的飞机还没有完全起飞,正好造成一个空子,被敌人钻了。结果就是我们九架轰炸机,16架拉-11式螺旋桨战斗机在开始的时候要对付至少比我们多一到两倍的喷气式飞机,这样我们的轰炸机也受了损失,我们的歼击机也受了损失。教训是非常沉痛的。

(声明:非转贴自DOF)
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发表于 2008-7-3 10:28:24 | 显示全部楼层
要说螺旋桨干喷气式,即使英美那边记录不知道,老大哥的阔日杜布也用LA7干掉一架ME262,这个世界第一绝对不轮不到中国人头上。

而且老美的记录里那天没有战损一架佩刀,油尽迫降或跳伞的例外。不少佩刀是打到油干飘回去的,包括那个双料王牌戴维斯,明知油料BINGO了仍然掉头回去帮同伴,最后滑翔降落返的场,那哥们也是条汉子。
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 楼主| 发表于 2008-7-3 10:41:46 | 显示全部楼层
原帖由 coolhand 于 2008-7-3 10:28 发表
而且老美的记录里那天没有战损一架佩刀,油尽迫降或跳伞的例外。不少佩刀是打到油干 ...

你可能不知道,老美一贯喜欢把自己被对方战机击落的飞机归为飞行事故或地面炮火所为。
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 楼主| 发表于 2008-7-3 10:44:27 | 显示全部楼层
American claims of 10:1 kill ratio (or some other fantastic ratio of this sort) during the Korean war in favor of the U.S. pilots is commonly explained by the \"superior\" training of American pilots. It is admitted by most Western historians and, most importantly, by many American pilots themselves, that technically the MiG-15 was at least a match for the best American jet fighter of the Korean War - the F-86 \"Sabre.\" It would be appropriate to mention that the UN air forces in Korea included many other aircraft types considerably inferior to the MiG-15.
In general, Western historians do not like to talk about why they think American pilots were the most experienced during the Korean War. There\'s certainly no way to support this position with facts simply because its erroneous. It is a fact that the Soviet pilots flew approximately 3.5 million combat sorties during the Second World War. This is 2-3 times more that the number of sorties flown by the U.S. pilots during this war. [\"Red Phoenix\", by Von Hardesty.] While the number of American W.W.II fighter aces, who shot down 20 or more aircraft, barely exceeds two dozen, the number of Soviet aces, who shot down 29 or more aircraft is well over a hundred. The number of Soviet aces credited with shooting down 20 or more aircraft during the Second World War is in hundreds. [Soviet Aces of World War 2, Hugh Morgan, Osprey aerospace, 1998]
This is a very important fact, considering that the Soviet pilots in Korea were represented by the best-of-the-best the VVS could offer. Many of the Second World War aces participated in the Korean war as pilots and commanders. This was a new era of jet aircraft, but the weapons used on aircraft were essentially the same old cannons and machine-guns taken from the propeller fighters of the W.W.II and most elements of air combat remained unchanged. Most but not all. As you will find out from the story below, W.W.II experience did not mean an automatic victory in Korea, especially when some high-ranking officials ignored warnings of experienced pilots.
There was an enormous gap is the number of experienced pilots in the US and the USSR after the Second World War. And this gap remained during the Korean War as well, allowing the Soviet VVS to attain a favorable 3.3:1 kill ratio against the UN aircraft. During the Korean War the VVS pilots flew 1,872 combat sorties and downed 1,106 US-made aircraft, of which 650 were F-86 \"Sabres.\" In air combat over Korea against the VVS, Americans lost about two \"Sabres\" for every downed Soviet MiG-15. [\"Russian Weapons: War and Peace,\" by Vladimir Babych, 1997]
During the Korean War, the best American ace, Capt. MacConnel, was credited with shooting down 16 MiG-15s, while the best Soviet ace, Capt. Sutyagin, downed 23 American aircraft. [\"Duel\" N 20 (42) - 21(43), 1997] The gap between Soviet and American aces remained during the Korean War: there were 40 American aces who were credited with shooting down 5 or more enemy fighters, while the number of Soviet aces with 5 or more kills was 51. [\"Duel\" N 20 (42) - 21(43), 1997]
The number of Soviet non-combat losses was only 10 aircraft. The number of non-combat losses, officially admitted by the US, is 945 [\"The United States Air Force in Korea 1950-1953\" by Robert Futrell]. This enormous number non-combat losses is a testament to the \"superior\" training of American pilots as well as to the attempts on the part of the US government and the military to present combat losses as \"accidents.\" The Chinese and Korean air forces lost 231 fighters in combat, which brings the total number of MiG losses to 576 aircraft. The Americans claimed to have shot down 2,300 \"Communist aircraft.\" [Aviation Encyclopedia, 1977, New-York] This was one of many wild claims made by the media and certain unscrupulous historians, contradicting even the USAF claims.
Later claims by the US of enemy aircraft downed during the Korean War, were revised to 976 and then further to 935 - still hundreds of aircraft more than the actual number of \"Communist\" aircraft downed.  Americans admitted to losing a total of 1,035 aircraft, of which 816 were downed by ground fire, 147 shot down in air-to-air combat, and 72 aircraft lost to unknown causes. [\"The United States Air Force in Korea 1950-1953\" by Robert Futrell] Other sources put just the USAF losses at 1,144 aircraft, 1,176 killed and 386 wounded in action. [Korean-War.com web site, by Ed Evanhoe]
Translation notes: In some cases I had to reverse-translate some of the text quoted by the article\'s authors from English-language sources. I tried to make the translation as accurate as possible, however, the exact text of the English-language original may differ slightly. If you are interested in the exact text of the quote, a list of sources is given at the end of the article.
Venik


[ 本帖最后由 ntrk 于 2008-7-3 10:45 编辑 ]
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 楼主| 发表于 2008-7-3 10:46:53 | 显示全部楼层
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发表于 2008-7-3 18:14:45 | 显示全部楼层
将损失分为战斗损失和事故损失是很严谨的做法,事故损失大于战斗损失也是正常的,这些不能成为怀疑的借口。

毛子注水的本领一点不比小日本差。空战中的overclaim是正常现象,很多战绩都需要事后查证双方的历史档案才能够核实。美国历史学者已经把每一架佩刀机的损失情况按机号一一列出,然而这样的考证在中国和俄国都是不可能实现的。如果不能复式记帐,那什么都是空的。

王天保的战绩连他自己都不能确认,只是事后根据照相枪判定。张积慧击落戴维斯的过程更是漏洞百出。战时是为了宣传上的需要,一旦上了贼船就下不来。让你拉四个人跟JG53的打对抗,交换比居然是2比1,你信么?
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发表于 2008-7-3 19:01:15 | 显示全部楼层
这么一扣  这么一打```又一扣  又 一打  扣啊 打啊```难道就不累么````还是说都是超人?
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发表于 2008-7-3 19:23:32 | 显示全部楼层
The Hunt for the \"Sabre\"
part I
A word from the translator
Links: Soviet W.W.II aces
Soviet and American W.W.II aces
USAF Aces of the Korean War Korean War Project
Korean air war chronology
The following is the first part (read the second part here) of the article by two Russian historians, Leonid Krylov and Yuri Tepsurkayev, about the history of air combat between the Soviet VVS and the U.S. air forces during the Korean War. The article was published in the \"Mir Aviatsii (\"The Aviation World\") magazine in 1998 and includes a lot of information from the recently - declassified Soviet archives from that period. The article deals with the effort by the VVS to capture a working \"Sabre\" by forcing it to land at a Soviet airfield.
American claims of 10:1 kill ratio (or some other fantastic ratio of this sort) during the Korean war in favor of the U.S. pilots is commonly explained by the \"superior\" training of American pilots. It is admitted by most Western historians and, most importantly, by many American pilots themselves, that technically the MiG-15 was at least a match for the best American jet fighter of the Korean War - the F-86 \"Sabre.\" It would be appropriate to mention that the UN air forces in Korea included many other aircraft types considerably inferior to the MiG-15.
In general, Western historians do not like to talk about why they think American pilots were the most experienced during the Korean War. There\'s certainly no way to support this position with facts simply because its erroneous. It is a fact that the Soviet pilots flew approximately 3.5 million combat sorties during the Second World War. This is 2-3 times more that the number of sorties flown by the U.S. pilots during this war. [\"Red Phoenix\", by Von Hardesty.] While the number of American W.W.II fighter aces, who shot down 20 or more aircraft, barely exceeds two dozen, the number of Soviet aces, who shot down 29 or more aircraft is well over a hundred. The number of Soviet aces credited with shooting down 20 or more aircraft during the Second World War is in hundreds. [Soviet Aces of World War 2, Hugh Morgan, Osprey aerospace, 1998]
This is a very important fact, considering that the Soviet pilots in Korea were represented by the best-of-the-best the VVS could offer. Many of the Second World War aces participated in the Korean war as pilots and commanders. This was a new era of jet aircraft, but the weapons used on aircraft were essentially the same old cannons and machine-guns taken from the propeller fighters of the W.W.II and most elements of air combat remained unchanged. Most but not all. As you will find out from the story below, W.W.II experience did not mean an automatic victory in Korea, especially when some high-ranking officials ignored warnings of experienced pilots.
There was an enormous gap is the number of experienced pilots in the US and the USSR after the Second World War. And this gap remained during the Korean War as well, allowing the Soviet VVS to attain a favorable 3.3:1 kill ratio against the UN aircraft. During the Korean War the VVS pilots flew 1,872 combat sorties and downed 1,106 US-made aircraft, of which 650 were F-86 \"Sabres.\" In air combat over Korea against the VVS, Americans lost about two \"Sabres\" for every downed Soviet MiG-15. [\"Russian Weapons: War and Peace,\" by Vladimir Babych, 1997]
During the Korean War, the best American ace, Capt. MacConnel, was credited with shooting down 16 MiG-15s, while the best Soviet ace, Capt. Sutyagin, downed 23 American aircraft. [\"Duel\" N 20 (42) - 21(43), 1997] The gap between Soviet and American aces remained during the Korean War: there were 40 American aces who were credited with shooting down 5 or more enemy fighters, while the number of Soviet aces with 5 or more kills was 51. [\"Duel\" N 20 (42) - 21(43), 1997]
The number of Soviet non-combat losses was only 10 aircraft. The number of non-combat losses, officially admitted by the US, is 945 [\"The United States Air Force in Korea 1950-1953\" by Robert Futrell]. This enormous number non-combat losses is a testament to the \"superior\" training of American pilots as well as to the attempts on the part of the US government and the military to present combat losses as \"accidents.\" The Chinese and Korean air forces lost 231 fighters in combat, which brings the total number of MiG losses to 576 aircraft. The Americans claimed to have shot down 2,300 \"Communist aircraft.\" [Aviation Encyclopedia, 1977, New-York] This was one of many wild claims made by the media and certain unscrupulous historians, contradicting even the USAF claims.
Later claims by the US of enemy aircraft downed during the Korean War, were revised to 976 and then further to 935 - still hundreds of aircraft more than the actual number of \"Communist\" aircraft downed.  Americans admitted to losing a total of 1,035 aircraft, of which 816 were downed by ground fire, 147 shot down in air-to-air combat, and 72 aircraft lost to unknown causes. [\"The United States Air Force in Korea 1950-1953\" by Robert Futrell] Other sources put just the USAF losses at 1,144 aircraft, 1,176 killed and 386 wounded in action. [Korean-War.com web site, by Ed Evanhoe]
Translation notes: In some cases I had to reverse-translate some of the text quoted by the article\'s authors from English-language sources. I tried to make the translation as accurate as possible, however, the exact text of the English-language original may differ slightly. If you are interested in the exact text of the quote, a list of sources is given at the end of the article.
Venik

Tail section of the MiG-15bis, s/n: 0715385, piloted by Capt. G.I. Ges\', which was damaged by a nearby explosion of an F-51 Mustang on June 20, 1951.


A damaged VK-1 jet engine.


Damage to the airbrake of a MiG-15 bis from 324th IAD sustained from a 12.7-mm bullet.
Some of the Soviet pilots of the Korean War (number of victories is given in parenthesis)

From left to right: G.U. Ohaj (11), N.M. Shvernik, N.V. Sutyagin (22-23), D.A. Samojlov (10)

Ye.G. Pepelyaev (19)

A.P. Smorchkov (12), D.P. Os\'kin (15)

S.M. Kramarenko (13)

M.A. Zyukov (4), D.A. Samojlov (10)

S.P. Subbotin (9)

M.I. Mihin (9), V.S. Miheyev (4)

G.I. Ges\' (8)

V.N. Alfeyev (7)

L.N. Ivanov (7)

S.A. Fedorets (7)

F.A. Shebanov (6)

B.V. Bokach (6)

A.M. Karelin (6)

B.S. Abakumov (5)

I.K. Shelomonov (5)

G.N. Berelidze (5)

V.P. Lepikov (4)

P.V. Ninervin (3)

K.N. Degtyarev (3)

Yu.N. Dobrovichan (3)

N.I. Shkodin (3)

F.G. Afanasyev (3)

N.I. Ivanov (3), N.P. Plishin, V.R. Veryaskin (1), L.I. Rusakov (1), N.V. Syuchev (2)


The MiG-15bis fighter of the 351st Fighter Aviation Regiment. Andun airbase, North Korea, fall of 1952.

Pre-flight preparation of the MiG-15bis, s/n: 53210546 of the 351st Fighter Aviation Regiment.
In the foreground: Ye.G. Pepelyaev, the second best ace of the Soviet AF during the Korean War. Later served as the commander of the \"Red Five\" MiG-15 demonstration team at the Kubinka AFB.

The F-86A-5-NA, s/n: 49-1319 downed by Pepelyaev on Oct. 6, 1951.

The MiG-15bis, s/n: 1315325 piloted by Pepelyaev and damaged in combat on Oct. 6, 1951.

The same MiG-15bis as above following repairs.

Maj. I.P. Golyshevsky in the cockpit of his MiG-15bis, s/n: 53210546 at the Andun airfield during the fall of 1952.


A flight of USAF B-29s being attacked by Capt. Suchkov on Apr. 7, 1951.


An F-86 being attacked by Col. Pepelyaev on Nov. 28, 1951.


MiG-15, s/n: 111025, of 1st Lt. A.P. Gogolyev of the 2nd Aviation Squadron, 176 Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment, 324 Fighter Aviation Division. Andun airfield, April 1951.

The MiG-15, s/n: 108023, damaged in combat on Apr. 12, 1951, and disassembled for repairs. Andun airfield, April 1951.

Maj. N.M. Zameskin, deputy commander of the 3rd Aviation Squadron, 878 Fighter Aviation Regiment, before a combat mission. Myaogou airfield, February 1953.
[Part I | Part II]
\"In November of 1950 MiG-15 fighters, flown by Soviet pilots, began operating in Korean airspace adjacent to the Chinese border. By the end of November all Soviet VVS units and squadrons participating in the Korean War were joined in the 64th Fighter Aviation Corps (IAK). As MiGs entered combat, UN air forces lost the unchallenged air superiority they enjoyed since July of 1950 in the skies over Korea. Soviet pilots took control of the airspace along the southern bank of the Yalutszyan river - an area later called \"The MiG Alley\" - making it one of the most dangerous places for UN pilots.
Unfortunately, we can\'t compare the number of victories achieved by the 64th IAK during the period from November to December of 1950 with the number of losses reported by the UN air forces. Western researchers are avoiding the specifics when discussing this period of the war. Nevertheless, they agree that \"...the MiG-15, designed as a dedicated fighter aircraft, did not encounter any difficulties in maintaining air superiority in its area of operation. Practically nothing could challenge MiG\'s control of the North Korean airspace, which allowed MiG-15s to effectively neutralize efforts by the enemy bomber aviation, in the process destroying such aircraft as B-26, B-29, F-80 and F-84.\" [1] In most cases MiGs would accomplish their combat tasks simply by showing up to intercept UN strike aircraft, forcing the enemy fighter-bomber pilots to dump their bombs and either to engage in air combat or to retreat. It is understandable that no military would accept such a situation. As the renown W.W.II fighter ace, James Johnson said, \"... United Nations pilots no longer had unlimited freedom in the Korean sky, and Weyland decided that the situation required to fight for air superiority over and to the south of Yalutszyan. He brought the \"Sabres\" to Korea, and in December they begun operating from Kimpho, near Seoul.\" [2] To be precise we must say that the \"Sabres\" were brought to Korea in December of 1950 by Gen. George Stratemeyer [8], while Otto P. Weyland [9] replaced him as the commander of the USAF in the Far-East in June of 1951. Most importantly, as J. Johnson correctly pointed out, for the first time since the beginning of the war, the USAF has sent aircraft to Korea with a single task in mind - to maintain air superiority.
The first encounter between MiGs and \"Sabres\", that took place on December 17, 1950, resulted in the victory of Lt. Col. Bruce Hinton, the commander of the 336th Squadron, 4th Air Wing, when he downed a technical instructor of the 50th Fighter Aviation Division (IAD), Maj. Yakov Efromeyenko. In three days, on December 21, Capt. Ivan Yurkevich from the 29th Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment (GvIAP), 50th IAD, downed the first F-86 of the war. According to American reports, the first \"Sabre\" was lost a day later.
December 22, 1950, in the West is called a big day for the UN pilots, when \"Sabres\" conducted a number of battles against the MiGs of the 50th IAD. Early in one of such battles, Capt. Nikolay Vorobyov of the 177th IAP downed the aircraft of Capt. Lawrence Bach of the 4th FW. During this day the warring sides claimed five downed F-86s and six destroyed MiG-15s (while the actual losses were only one \"Sabre\" and two MiGs).
The F-86 made a big difference in the air war over Korea. During the one-and-a-half months before the F-86 appeared in the \"MiG Alley,\" the Soviet divisions lost three MiG-15s in air combat. Just as many MiGs were lost during the two weeks after the F-86s entered combat...
* * *
The F-86 - the only aircraft that could challenge the MiG-15 - attracted enormous interest of all Soviet military and aviation organizations. The \"Sabre\" had to be studied if only to find the most effective means of defeating it. However, there was little hope of obtaining this aircraft as a trophy. If an F-86 was still able to fly after being damaged, the pilot would take it to the Korean gulf, where he could safely leave the aircraft. The excellent search and rescue units operated by the US and the dominance of the US Navy in the waters near the shore offered pilots a good chance to survive after ejecting. Soviet experts could even hope to recover an aircraft that crashed a few kilometers from the shore. If the \"Sabre\" sustained serious combat damage and crashed in Northern Korea - with or without the pilot - the aircraft\'s wreck could tell nothing more about the aircraft than the ashes of a burned book can tell about its content. Finally, the answer - or something that seemed as the answer to the high command - was found.
In April of 1951 a group of test pilots from the GK NII VVS (Soviet AF research organization) arrived to northeastern China with the order from the VVS Supreme Commander to force a \"Sabre\" to land at a Soviet airfield. It was impossible to determine the exact date of the GK NII VVS group\'s arrival, however, it is known that an oral order was given by the commander of the fighter division of the GK NII VVS, Lt. Gen. Blagoveshchensky, on April 26 to accept the group of test pilots at the 151st GvIAD - a second-echelon division of the 64th Fighter Aviation Corps. This was the first of the few records found about this group in the documents of the 64th IAK. In this documents the test pilots are identified as the \"Blagoveshchensky\'s group,\" - Gen. Blagoveshchensky was in charge of the group - but more often the test pilots were identified as the \"Comrade Dzyubenko\'s group - Dzyubenko was the immediate commander of the GK NII VVS group of test pilots. Due to the limited documented information, our story will rely to a great extent on the interviews with the veterans of the 64th IAK.
According to the available documents, the GK NII VVS group included Gen. Blagoveshchensky and twelve more pilots: Lt. Col. Dzyubenko, Engineer-Major Trofimov, Majors Gulyayev, Mitusov, and Perevozchikov, Captains Makhalin and Kurashev, 1st Lieutenants. Alikhnovich, Bobonin, Semenenko, Serdyuk and Tikhomirov - these are the pilots who directly participated in the combat flights. According to 64th IAK veterans, the group consisted of 16 men and included Lt. Col. Roslyakov (either Gen. Blagoveshchensky\'s deputy or the group\'s staff commander) and Suprun (his rank and position are not known) - the brother of the famous test pilot, Stephan Suprun. The group was comprised of highly-skilled pilots with considerable combat experience: test pilots and combat pilots with ranks of unit commander and above. In particular, Lt. Col. Roslyakov was a deputy division commander, Col. Dzyubenko was a regiment commander, and Maj. Mitusov was a deputy regiment commander.
For about a month the group of test pilots remained at the second-echelon airfields, training for their mission. At the same time the test pilots gave lectures to the pilots of the 64th IAK on the subject of high-speed aerodynamics in regard to the MiG-15. Meanwhile, Gen. Blagoveshchensky visited the frontal airfield of Andun. Combat reports of the 324th IAD mention, that on May 10, 1951, at 1359 local time a group of 10 MiG-15bis of the 18th GvIAP, 303rd IAD, lead by Capt. Maznyev, were dispatched to provide air cover to the airfield and areas around Andun and Suiho. Gen. Blagoveshchensky participated in this mission, escorted by two pilots from the 196th IAP, 324 IAD - 1st Lieutenants. Soskovets and Savchenko.
The rest of the GK NII VVS group followed Gen. Blagoveshchensky to Andun in late May. Commander of the 196th IAP, 324th IAD, Yevgeniy G. Pepelyaev remembers:
\"Blagoveshchensky again arrived to Andun on a transport plane along with a group of test pilots and pilots from combat units. This led to an argument: Blagoveshchensky\'s pilots wanted to fly on the aircraft of my regiment, but I was against it. They tried to offer me something in return:
-- Let\'s do this, we will give you all of out victories.
I replied:
-- I don\'t need your victories and won\'t have any. You will be lucky if you manage to stay alive.
After that the division commander finally persuaded me. It was agreed that the aircraft of the same squadron are being flown by my pilots every other day.\"
An order, issued by the commander of the 324th IAD I. Kozhedub on May 29, assigned Dzyubenko\'s flight group # 043 to the 196th IAP, under the tactical command of the regiment commander, Col. Pepelyaev. According to this order, of the16 new MiG-15bis, 13th series manufactured at the Novosibirsk factory # 153, 13 were assigned to the 196th IAP and only three - to the 176th GvIAP. The regiment commanders were to receive the aircraft from the technical unit of the 151st division in Anshan, which, evidently, handled the final assembly of the aircraft received from the manufacturer. Interesting that the three MiGs of the 13th series were given to the 176th GvIAP ten days before the order was issued. It is possible that the order was written after the MiGs have been already distributed between the two regiments to provide a legal basis for the distribution of the aircraft. The same order assigned crews to the aircraft, which in the 196th IAP meant that each of the 13 new MiG-15bis had two pilots - one from the regiment and the other one from Dzyubenko\'s group.
Pilots and technicians of the 324th IAD jokingly called the test pilots \"the Group Nord,\" and the group\'s task was regarded with considerable skepticism. The overall situation was described by the Lieutenant-technician of the 3rd Squadron, 176th GvIAP, Nikolay M. Chepelev:
\"The \"Sabre\" was a difficult aircraft to shoot down, and as to forcing it to land... That was easy only on paper for people sitting in Moscow.\" There was also a lot of skepticism regarding the Dzyubenko\'s team\'s ability to participate in air combat against the Americans. Excellent individual training and W.W.II experience, of course, are all very good things, but there was concern regarding the test pilot\'s ability to function as a group in combat, their knowledge of tactics. Of course, the main aspects of air combat remained unchanged since the Second World War, however, every war has its unique aspects and the new jet aircraft used in Korea were one of such aspects. Higher speeds and altitude of air combat meant greater distances in maneuvering, less time for attack and defense. At high altitudes, group maneuvers of MiG-15s had some new aspects; the same was true for low-altitude group maneuvers. Air combat with \"Sabres\" - the subject of Dzyubenko\'s team\'s hunt - had many uncommon elements. Not knowing and not having practiced these skills, a \"hunter\" faced a likely defeat. An increased attention was paid to precision formation flying, correct distribution of combat and observation zones among pilots in the group, ability to launch precision, well-coordinated attacks. New tactical maneuvers were invented and some of the old ones were substantially changed. The list of skills required from a fighter pilot in Korea can be continued further, however, let\'s stop here - this is enough to understand that without preliminary training even an experienced pilot in Korea was rather a pray than a hunter.
Ye.G. Pepelyaev remembers:
\"As I found out from the conversations with the pilots, their task was to force a \"Sabre\" to land. This aircraft was equipped with an anti-g suite, which presented a considerable interest for our aviation industry. However, when a \"Sabre\" was shot down and the pilot ejected, all that remained with the pilot was the suite itself and a pipe, which connected the suite to a system controlling pressure in the suite. The pressure control system - the most important part of the whole thing - was installed inside the aircraft and, of course, was destroyed along with the plane. In order to get the functioning pressure control system we had to get a working aircraft.
I was amused by this assignment. Individual experience of the test pilots was substantial, but the pilots from combat units were not too well trained. I can judge their abilities because some of them were later transferred to my regiment. Before coming to us, Blagoveshchensky\'s team was training either in Anshan or Mukden; they were training all by themselves, conducting flight training and air combat exercises for about a month or so. They figured this kind of training will suffice, but I knew for sure that this was not enough. We had trained for three months when we got an opportunity to work on our skills. If it wasn\'t for these months of training, we would have suffered heavy losses. I offered Blagoveshchensky\'s group my help: at least to talk with them and explain a few things. They declined my offer.\"
Lev N. Ivanov, back then a Captain and the commander of a fighter unit of the 196th IAP, remembers:
\"They had a lot of attitude - all commanders. They had to land a \"Sabre.\" We would always make fun of them. They were surprised:
-- Why?
-- You\'ll find out when you come to you senses!\"
On May 31st Dzyubenko\'s team left on the fist combat mission over the Korean peninsula. As everyone feared, the result was most unfortunate.
On that day the 12 pilots of the group were flying a patrol mission over combat zone. On the approach to Andju at an altitude of 11 kilometers,  they noticed a pair of B-29 flying at their lower left and escorted by four \"Sabres.\" Lt. Col. Dzyubenko led the first unit into the attack in a turning dive. Along with his wingman, Maj. Gulyayev, at high speed he attacked the first \"Superfortress,\" which was also attacked by the second pair of the unit - 1st Lieutenants. Bobonin and Alikhnovich. When exiting the attack, Dzyubenko noticed a pair of F-86s and attacked them head-on, later getting on their tail. The \"Sabres\" pulled a sharp turn and managed to escape toward the sea. Dzyubenko\'s wingmen tried to engage the second pair of F-86s, which did not accept the fight and evaded. After that Maj. Gulyayev and 1st Lt. Bobonin launched another attack against the B-29. At that time Bobonin\'s wingmen, Alikhnovich, was attacked by two F-86s and was forced to leave combat after his aircraft sustained seven hits. Bobonin\'s aircraft was also damaged: a dent was left on the tail section of the fuselage from fuel tanks dropped by someone from above.
Other units of MiGs also tried to engage the \"Superfortresses,\" however, every time they forced to engage the \"Sabres.\" The pilots did not see any effect of their attacks on the bombers, which was not surprising considering that they fired from 2000 - 2500 meters away. Attacks against the F-86s also yielded no results. During one of the attacks against a B-29, 1st Lt. Semenenko got ahead of his leader, Maj. Perevozchikov and, after exiting the attack in a combat turn, he lost the sight of the his leader. Nobody saw Maj. Perevozchikov since. According to N.M. Chepelev, an investigative commission, which later arrived to the area, established that Perevozchikov \"... was shot down by an F-86, he ejected and deployed his parachute, but slipped out of the harness and fall to the ground. Later it was established that the parachute was not his and the harness was not properly fit.\" L.N. Ivanov remembers: \"When Perevozchikov was sitting in the cockpit before take-off, he unbuckled the parachute - it was more comfortable that way. He forgot to fasten the parachute before taking-off.\" After this mission airfield technicians and pilots changed the nickname of Dzyubenko\'s team to \"Team Feathers,\" implying that that\'s what was flying when the team encountered the numerically-inferior enemy.
After Maj. Perevozchikov\'s funeral at a new Russian cemetery in Port Arthur, commanders of the NII VVS, after witnessing first-hand lack of experience on the part of their pilots, officially requested assistance from the command of the 196th IAP. After several lectures on tactics, conducted by Col. Pepelyaev, the group returned back to Korea. The next flight went well, but during landing a tragedy struck.
In group flights aircraft were taking-off and landing in a predetermined order and position: planes would take-off in pairs and land one after another, separated by about 1000 - 1500 meters from each other. The first aircraft would touch down at the left edge of the landing strip and the plane behind it would keep to the right side of the runway, etc. The first to land was Dzyubenko\'s wingman, Maj. Gulyayev - on the left side of the landing strip. Dzyubenko, however, touched down at the center of the runway and came dangerously close to the first aircraft. Adding to the problem was strong side wind, which pushed Dzyubenko\'s plane toward his wingman. Dzyubenko ignored the command from the ground control center to abort the landing and when he tried to stabilize his aircraft after touchdown, Dzyubenko found himself in the turbulent path of the MiG in front of him. His aircraft tilted to the side and the wing scraped the runway. The aircraft flipped over its nose section and slid along the  runway on it upper fuselage, grinding down its tail and canopy, along with the pilot\'s head. The engine was still running and the aircraft, escorted by mechanics running alongside it, continued to be dragged across the airfield until it hit a fence.
Lt. Col. Dzyubenko died in this accident, which took place on June 5, and the next day the NII VVS group is mentioned in the official documents of the 196th IAP for the last time. After June 7 \"Blagoveshchensky\'s group\" disappears from all combat reports of the division. The group no longer participated in any combat operations.
The last time the test pilots were mentioned in documents of the 64th IAK was in late July. On July 29, 1951, the commander of the 64th IAK ordered the group to be dismissed from the 151st division. Some of the pilots remained in combat units operating in Korea, Majors Gulyayev and Mitusov, as well as the 1st Lt. Serdyuk were sent to the 324th IAD, 1st Lieutenants. Bobonin and Semenenko - to 303rd IAD. Under the leadership of experienced commanders all these pilots successfully continued operations in Korea and received combat awards. Maj. Mitusov, who served as the deputy commander of the196th IAP was even considered for the Hero of the Soviet Union award and later replaced Col. Pepelyaev as the regiment commander. The rest of the pilots, except for the 1st Lt. Alikhnovich, who was sent to the VVS personnel department, returned back to their work at the GK NII. Thus ended the first stage of the \"hunt for the \"Sabre\". END OF PART I
[Part I | Part II]
Notes:
1) R.F. Dorr, J. Lake, W. Thompson. Korean War Aces. London, Osprey Publishing 1995, p. 16.
2) J.E. Johnson. Full Circle. The Story of Air Fighting. London, Chatto & Windus, 1964, p. 268
3) According to American sources, two F-86s of the 336th FS, 4th FW, were lost on Oct. 6, 1951. The F-86E #50-671 was shot down by a MiG. Pilot ejected. The F-86A #49-1319 was damaged in combat and had to land on water. Another F-86A #49-1178 of the same FS was damaged in combat.
4) TsAMO RF, 324 IAP files, 539839s, 1, 226-227
5) In modern terminology - \"afterburning.\" The non-afterburning J47 engines installed on the \"Sabres\" left a black trail of smoke, however, this smoke was not the sign of afterburning, which is often mentioned in the documents of the 64th IAK. In this case the \"Sabre\" was smoking probably because of combat damage. (author\'s note)
6) TsAMO RF, 176th GvIAP files, 539888s, 7, 133
7) The B-26 Invader, which operated during the night, was nicknamed the \"night watchman.\" (author\'s note)
8) Stratemeyer, George Edward--General Stratemeyer became the commanding general, Far East Air Force in April 1949 and was in command there when the Korean War began. He suffered a severe heart attack in May 1951 and relinquished his command to Gen. Otto P. Weyland in June 1951. He retired from active duty Jan. 31, 1952.
9) Weyland, Otto Paul--Named commanding general of the Tactical Air Command in July 1950. He replaced General Stratemeyer as commanding general, Far East Air Force in June 1951 and remained in that position for the remainder of the war.
(\"The Hunt for the Sabre\" by Leonid Krylov and Yuri Tepsurkayev, Mir Aviatsii, #2 (16), 1998;  translated by Venik;
the original article in Russian and more photos and articles can be found at the Russian Air Force web site;
A comprehensive list of UN aviation losses during the Korean war can be found at the Korean War web site. On this site you can also find the order of battle of the Soviet AF in the Korean War and some other useful information;
I would like to thank Alex Medvedev for locating photos of Soviet AF operations in Korea.)
Fighter aircraft of the Korean War Mikoyan & Gurevich MiG-15

\"The MiG-15 came as a surprise to the Allies during the Korean War, where it was a match for any fighter it met, including early versions of the United States\' famed North American F-86 Sabre. Fast, agile, and reasonably well armed, the MiG-15 was a dangerous foe when flown by an experienced, aggressive pilot. During the course of the Korean War, the telling difference between the performance of the MiG-15 and the F-86 was attributed to pilot training and the more advanced weapon system of the American aircraft. The first mass-produced Soviet jet fighter, the MiG-15 was powered by a Klimov turbojet developed from the Rolls-Royce Nene engine. Today, some MiG-15s continue to serve in several of the world\'s air forces, nearly a half-century after the prototype\'s first flight.\"
(source: Knowledge Adventure)
SPECIFICATIONS
CountryRussia
ManufacturerMikoyan & Gurevich
DesignationMiG-15 (NATO code named Fagot)
TypeFighter; Trainer; Recon.
Service Dates1948 to present
Length36\'-4\"
Wingspan33\'-1\"
Height11\'-1.75\"
Empty Weight8,320 lbs
Gross Weight11,268 lbs
Maximum Speed683 mph at sea level
Maximum Range1,200 miles
Maximum Altitude51,000 ft
Number of Crew1 (2 in trainer)
Engine TypeJet
Engine Manu- facturerKlimov
Engine DesignationVK-1 x 1
Engine Thrust5,935 lbs

Republic F-84 Thunderjet


\"Republic\'s F-84 was one of the earliest US jet fighters and was direct competition for the smaller and lighter Lockheed F-80. Fast and agile, the Thunderjet proved to be a transition fighter for the period between World War II and the 1950s, when innovative technology such as the swept wing was rapidly becoming standard for aircraft of the Thunderjet\'s type. These first-generation F-84s were equipped with straight wings, which limited their maximum speed but improved their ability to carry heavy external loads. With this capability, they were assigned the primary role of ground-attack aircraft and were used successfully in Korea. Following service with the US Air Force, many Thunderjets were provided to NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) air forces and served well until being removed from service.\"
(source: Knowledge Adventure)
SPECIFICATIONS
CountryUnited States of America
Manu- facturerRepublic
DesignationF-84 Thunderjet
TypeFighter
Service Dates1947 to late 1950s
Length38\'-1\"
Wingspan36\'-5\"
Height12\'-7\"
Empty Weight11,095 lbs
Gross Weight23,525 lbs
Maximum Speed622 mph at sea level
Maximum Range2,000 miles
Maximum Altitude40,500 ft
Number of Crew1
Engine TypeJet
Engine ManufacturerAllison
Engine DesignationJ35 x 1
Engine Thrust5,600 lbs

Republic F-84F Thunderstreak


\"Republic\'s Thunderstreak continued in the tradition of the Thunderjet and Thunderbolt. It was capable of carrying a sizable payload and so was used primarily for ground attack, though it was a very capable air-to-air dogfighter when necessary. Fast but somewhat underpowered, it required a long runway for take-off in high temperatures and under other unfavorable conditions. Thunderstreaks were eventually provided to several NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) countries and served there until replaced by more advanced aircraft during the mid-1970s.\"
(source: Knowledge Adventure)
SPECIFICATIONS
CountryUnited States of America
ManufacturerRepublic
DesignationF-84F Thunder- streak
TypeFighter
Service Dates1952 to late 1980s
Length43\'-4\"
Wingspan33\'-7\"
Height14\'-4\"
Empty Weight19,340 lbs
Gross Weight28,000 lbs
Maximum Speed695 mph at sea level
Maximum Range2,300 miles
Maximum Altitude44,300 ft
Number of Crew1
Engine TypeJet
Engine Manu- facturerWright
Engine DesignationJ65 x 1
Engine Thrust7,220 lbs

Gloster Meteor


\"The Gloster Meteor was the first operational Allied jet-powered aircraft to fly -- and the only Allied jet-powered aircraft to actually participate in World War II. Using engine technology developed by the great British propulsion pioneer Frank Whittle, Gloster was second only to the Germans in getting a jet-powered aircraft into the air. The E.28/39 made its first flight in May of 1941. Design of the Meteor was completed not long afterward and by 1944 it was flying in combat against German aircraft. After the war, the Meteor was successful in the postwar Royal Air Force and continued in service for over two decades before being sidelined for more advanced aircraft.\"
(source: Knowledge Adventure)
SPECIFICATIONS
CountryGreat Britain
Manu- facturerGloster
DesignationMeteor
TypeFighter; Trainer; Recon.
Service Dates1945 to 1965
Length41\'-4\"
Wingspan43\'-0\"
Height13\'-0\"
Empty Weight9,980 lbs
Gross Weight15,175 lbs
Maximum Speed585 mph at sea level
Maximum Range2,000 miles
Maximum Altitude44,000 ft
Number of Crew1 (2 in trainer)
Engine TypeJet
Engine Manu- facturerRolls-Royce
Engine DesignationDerwent x 2
Engine Thrust3,600 lbs

F-86 Sabre


\"First Flight: 1949. More than 6,000 F-86s were manufactured by North American\'s Los Angeles and Columbus, Ohio, divisions.
The first swept-wing airplane in the U.S. fighter inventory. Four models of the craft (F-86A, E, F and H) were day fighters or fighter bombers, while the F-86D, K and L versions were all-weather interceptors.
Successive models of the daylight versions--all designed to destroy hostile aircraft in flight or on the ground--were equipped with more powerful engines and armament systems that ranged from bombs and rockets to machine guns and cannon. All are rated in the 650 mph class with a 600-mile combat radius and a service ceiling of over 45,000 feet.
The three interceptor versions sported black radome noses, replacing the yawning jet intakes of the other models. The K model, manufactured in Turin, Italy, by Fiat, was flown by NATO forces. The F-86L had added equipment for use in conjunction with the U.S. SAGE (semi-automatic ground environment) defense system.
Forerunner of the operational Sabre was the XF-86, first flown Oct. 1, 1947, by North American test pilot George Welch. A few months later Welch became the first pilot to fly the plane at Mach 1 (the speed of sound) in routine flight. Although technically rated as subsonic, the Sabre is no stranger to supersonic speeds.
Various models of the Sabre held world\'s speed records for six consecutive years, setting five official records and winning several National Aircraft Show Bendix Trophies.
In September 1948, an F-86A set the Sabre\'s first official world speed record of 570 mph. This mark was bettered in 1952 by an F-86D that flew at 698 mph. The \"D\" became the first model of a fighter to better its own record, in 1953, with a run of 715 mph.
The F-86E and subsequent models incorporated a unique control system, developed by North American, called the \"all-flying tail.\" Where the F-86A contained a booster control system that called for the pilot to do part of the work of controlling the aircraft, the newer system added full- power operated control for better maneuverability at high speeds. An \"artificial feel\" was built into the aircraft\'s controls to give the pilot forces on the stick that were still conventional, but light enough for superior combat control.
U.S. production of the Sabre Jet ended in December 1956.\"
(source: Boeing)
Specifications
dimen- sionsSpan: 37 feet; Length: 37 feet; Height: 14 feet
wingsSpar: Aluminum
Ribs: Aluminum
Covering: Aluminum
first flightSept. 23, 1950
first delivery Feb. 9, 1951
power- plantGeneral Electric J-47-13 turbojet Thrust: 5,200 pounds
preform- anceSpeed: 565 knots (650 mph) Class
Range: Approx. 870 nautical miles (1,000 statute miles)
Service Ceiling: over 45,000 feet
weightCombat weight: 14,000 pounds
armamentSix .50 cal. machine guns 16 five-inch HVAR rockets or 2,000 pound max. bomb load
missionThe destruction of hostile aircraft in flight.
develop- mentThe F-86E is basically an F-86A modified to incorporate aerodynamic and system changes. The original model, the F-86A, was first operational swept-wing airplane to fly in the United States.
descrip- tionSpecial features are swept-back wing and tail, electrically operated flaps, hydraulically operated speed brakes, automatic wing leading-edge slats, hydraulic-power-operated irreversible controls with artificial feel for the all-movable horizontal tail and ailerons.
North American P-51 Mustang

\"robably the most popular of all US World War II era fighters, North American\'s P-51 Mustang was a thoroughbred and highly respected by friend and foe alike. Fast, agile, well armed, and dependable, the Mustang was a very capable fighting machine. Thousands were built during the war, with improvements in engine power and range making it a valuable long-range escort fighter for Allied bombers over Germany. The introduction of the revolutionary bubble canopy on the P-51D afforded the pilot all-around visibility. After the end of hostilities, it remained in active and reserve status until the late 1950s. Even after that, a few aircraft were retained into the mid-1970s by the US Army for use as chase aircraft on research projects. Today a modest number of Mustangs survive as sport and racing aircraft.\"
(source: Knowledge Adventure)
SPECIFICATIONS
CountryUnited States of America
ManufacturerNorth American
DesignationP-51 Mustang
TypeFighter
Service Dates1942 to present
Length33\'-4\"
Wingspan37\'-0\"
Height13\'-8\"
Empty Weight7,125 lbs
Gross Weight11,600 lbs
Maximum Speed440 mph
Maximum Range850 miles
Maximum Altitude41,900 ft
Number of Crew1 (2 in trainer)
Engine TypeReciprocating
Engine ManufacturerRolls-Royce
Engine DesignationV1650 Merlin x 1
Engine Horsepower1,650 hp
Vought F4U Corsair

\"robably the most potent US Navy fighter to enter service during World War II, the Vought Corsair was a large, powerful fighter equipped with four 20-mm cannons and up to 10 rockets or a total of 1,600 pounds of bombs. It had a distinctive inverted gullwing design that lifted the engine well off the ground for adequate propeller clearance and, at the same time, enabled a short retractable undercarriage to be fitted. After service with the US Navy and United Kingdom\'s Royal Navy, the Corsair remained in production until the mid-1950s and fought in the Korean War. It was also supplied to the French and Argentine air forces.\"
(source: Knowledge Adventure)
SPECIFICATIONS
CountryUnited States of America
ManufacturerVought
DesignationF4U Corsair
TypeFighter
Service Dates1943 to 1964
Length34\'-7\"
Wingspan41\'-0\"
Height14\'-9\"
Empty Weight9,230 lbs
Gross Weight12,399 lbs
Maximum Speed450 mph at 26,000 feet
Maximum Range1,120 miles
Maximum Altitude41,000 ft
Number of Crew1
Engine TypeReciprocating
Engine ManufacturerPratt & Whitney
Engine DesignationR2800 radial x 1
Engine Horsepower2,100 hp
Bomber aircraft of the Korean War
Boeing B-29 Superfortress

\"The Boeing B-29 Superfortress was the most impressive and capable heavy bomber in World War II. It set the standard for bomber design for several decades to come. Unlike any bomber before it, the B-29 was pressurized, very heavy, and had such a long range that it was capable of carrying a bomb load straight to the enemy without having to refuel. The success of the B-29, and its B-17 predecessor, set Boeing on the path to becoming the world\'s most successful manufacturer of large aircraft. The B-29 assured its place in history by dropping two atomic bombs on Japan, the only nuclear weapons ever used in warfare.\"
(source: Knowledge Adventure)
SPECIFICATIONS
CountryUnited States of America
ManufacturerBoeing
DesignationB-29 Superfortress
TypeBomber
Service Dates1944 to mid-1950s
Length99\'-0\"
Wingspan141\'-3\"
Height29\'-7\"
Empty Weight70,140 lbs
Gross Weight124,000 lbs
Maximum Speed358 mph
Maximum Range3,250 miles
Maximum Altitude31,850 ft
Number of Crew10 +
Engine TypeReciprocating
Engine ManufacturerPratt & Whitney
Engine DesignationR3350 x 4
Engine Horsepower2,200 hp


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发表于 2008-7-4 09:09:20 | 显示全部楼层

何必较真!

我们要肯定的是老一辈的军人敢开这螺旋桨飞机较量喷气式飞机,这种勇气是值得称赞的.而那些战果的真实性不过是政治宣传的需要,我们何必要再那么的较真呢!!!让我们向当年为共和国奋战过的英雄致敬!!
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