二战时候舰载飞机如何导航?
我想问一下，二战时的飞机尤其是舰载战斗机如何导航。他们和敌机进行空战后如何知道自己的母舰在哪啊！！！ 无线电导航 无线电怎么导航？？，航母上安个vor台？？？？？？？ 记住航母的方位，尽量明确自己的位置，然后再依靠无线电导航，如果收的到的话 手里一定要拿一份航图，否则，凶多吉少啊！ 这个问题 去问 日本轰炸珍珠港的飞行员去问美国海军航空兵， 他们知道~
欢迎历史达人， 现场解答！ http://www.ww2f.com/naval-warfare-pacific/31048-carrier-aircraft-navigation-how-did-they-do.html
My father was a carrier pilot in WW II, serving from 1941 until 1946 in the Pacific. He flew SBD's in 1942, was a flight instructor in the States for most of 1943, and returned to the Pacific flying F6F's from 1944 to 1946.
Over-water navigation was always one of the most difficult challenges that Navy pilots faced. Combined with weather which might change rapidly, navigational errors probably killed as many naval pilots as did the enemy. When flying from carriers, pilots were briefed on what courses to fly both outbound and inbound, and were advised of a "Point Option", which was the location the carrier expected to be at the time the pilots returned from their mission.
Things sometimes happened to cause the carrier to alter it's plans and in that case it wouldn't be at "Point Option". In that case, the pilot had two options; conduct a search for the carrier with what fuel it had remaining, or hope to pick up the homing beacon each carrier operated.
All US carriers were equipped at the start of the war with a device called the YE-ZB. This was a UHF (line of sight) transmitter which transmitted a Morse code letter denoting 15 degrees of a circle. If the pilot picked up a Morse "M" for instance and homed on it, then started picking up another letter, he would know he was moving an a tangential course in relation to the carrier; he would then turn and home on the strongest signal. Since this was a UHF device it worked better at higher altitudes. It wasn't extremely reliable and some pilots were better at using it than others, so pilots had differing levels of confidence in it.
Planes with multiple crew members, like SBD's and TBM's had an advantage in that the pilot could concemtrate on flying while a crew member was delegated to attend to navigation. Fighter pilots, of course, were most likely to become a victim of faulty navigation because they were by themselves, and air combat with enemy fighters would often cause them to become disoriented as to their location. My father once said he felt that perhaps as many as a quarter of all losses of carrier aircraft were due to the pilot becoming lost, but this, I think, was just a guess. In some exceptional cases, like Mitscher's command at the Battle of Philippine Sea, carriers might display lights at night to help lost pilots. In fact, Mitscher's task Groups not only displayed lights, they directed search lights straight upward, fired star shells, and turned on all deck lights on all ships, escorts included. This confused at least some of the returning pilots, at least one of whom made a landing approach on a destroyer.
Two ways, the old way and the new way.
The old way: USN carrier pilots were generally pretty skilled at navigation. One took into account the mission parameters - - - go so far at such and so speed and on such and so bearing, do whatever you supposed to do, then go back on this or that bearing to find the ship. Each pilot had a plotting board for keeping track of where he was based on the mission parameters. Before taking off, with some notable historical exceptions, he would be given the location of "Point Option" - the location of where the ship expected to be at the end of the time allotted for the mission. So starting from a known point, time, bearing, and distance navigation to another point, do your business, and time, bearing, and distance to a pre-plotted point.
The new way, as DA noted, was utilization of the YE-ZB homing system, developed by Frank Akers, which all USN carriers had at the start of the war. Without going into the boring details, this system used a morse code transmission of a particular letter for a particular bearing, a different letter for each 15 degree sector. This was a UHF line-of-sight system, so the higher you were the better. If the letter you were receiving changed, then you knew you were moving tangentially to the transmission point. You simply found the strongest signal and followed it back to the ship. In the early days of the war it was a fairly new system and some pilots were more proficient with it than others and those less proficient tended to be less believing. For example on the 4 May 42 Yorktown strike on Tulagi, there were 4 F4Fs very hurriedly sent off to deal with some F1Ms that were bothering the SBD and TBD strike planes. After performing their mission, shooting down 3 of the F1Ms, and shooting up a destroyer they happened upon, they started to head back to the ship. The division leader signaled for an increase in altitude to pick up the YE-ZB signal, but his section leader did not see the signal (although the section leader's wingman did). So the division leader and his wingman pulled up through the cloud layer, picked up the signal, and, after milling about a bit waiting for the other two, proceeded back to the ship. The section leader left behind had a problem, his radio did not work. His wingman's did. Eventually they came up through the clouds and the wingman picked up the YE-ZB signal. He also made radio contact with the ship and started flying a box pattern so the ship could get a good radio fix so to tell him which letter he should be listening for. Well, as far as the section leader was concerned, his wingman was flying in all sorts of odd directions for no apparent reason and finally signaled him to knock it off and then led the way back to Guadalcanal where they bellied in on Cape Henslow - - - with the wingman keeping a running commentary with the ship the whole time. Result was two of the ship's 18 F4Fs were lost for no apparent reason. The two pilots were rescued the next day through some extraordinary efforts by the crew of USS Hammann. Apropos of nothing else, I have the original flight instructions for this mission carried by the division leader. It clearly indicates the ship's location relative to Tulagi and the Point Option for the return. The division leader was clear in his recounting that the instructions would have gotten him back to the ship, but the YE-ZB was easier.
Even worse happened at Midway when the VF-8 strike escort improperly used their YE-ZB and all 10 of them ended up ditched at various locations. Fortunately for some of them some rather diligent PBY crews managed to find and rescue 8 as I recall. This was a combination screw up in that the flight was not given a Point Option and their own unfamiliarity with the YE-ZB system sealed their fate. They actually saw the smoke of the US task group off to their north as they headed off into the expanse of the Pacific, but were so screwed up in their navigation that the leader presumed he was looking at the Japanese.
Rich
Last edited by R Leonard; April 19th, 2009 at 09:24 PM.
As far as I know, the Japanese carriers had no electronic homing beacons or other navigational aids, and Japanese carrier pilots, at least early in the war, relied solely on good old fashioned "dead reckoning" navigation. I believe Japanese carrier aircraft with multiple crew members often carried radios which could take crude bearings on radio transmissions and may have used these whenever possible as rough navigation markers. But of course, Japanese carriers, just like American carriers usually tried to avoid frequent radio transmissions. At the start of the war, Japanese aircrew were trained in celestial navigation and thus sometimes had the opportunity to use this method to fix their position, particularly in the longer-ranged planes.
Japanese carrier pilots, flying fighters, frequently didn't even have radios in their aircraft because of weight and reliability issues, and therefore had to rely on nothing but compass and dead reckoning for navigation. They suffered the same problems as their American counterparts because of this, except that their planes were longer-ranged and that exacerbated their problems.
After 1942, Japanese carrier pilots seldom had the opportunity to operate from carriers in combat situations, more often flying from island bases, and their navigational problems may have been eased somewhat. But this was probably offset by the fact that newer pilots had less training and experience in over-water navigation and their losses due to becoming lost must have been severe.
Well, it's a debatable matter.
Mitscher was gambling that the Japanese would not be able to inflict significant damage on his ships, even if they found them. He knew that there were only two agencies that might be able to harm his forces; subs and air attack. Mitscher's fliers had just inflicted a severe defeat on the Japanese carriers, rendering their air groups practically defunct. Mitscher did not know the exact details but he knew that the Japanese carriers had been badly damaged and the bulk of their planes shot down, so it was reasonable for him to assume that air attacks were highly unlikely.
The other threat, subs, was also unlikely to be able to inflict unacceptable damage on Mitscher's ships. Mitscher knew that American ASW against Japanese subs had been very effective in the past several months, and that the last American CV sunk by a Japanese sub had been in 1942. So he probably felt that the risk of sub attack against his fast moving carriers was minimal. Mitscher could logically argue in that time and place that the odds of the Japanese being able to attack his forces were relatively low and that the benefits of recovering a significant number of his fliers who otherwise would have been lost, outweighed the risk of damage to his ships.
Whether or not one agrees with that assessment depends on the weight given to the various factors involved. My father happens to have been there, although he did not peronally benefit from the decision, and always agreed with Mitscher's reasoning.
It would be difficult for an adversary to use the YE-ZB system to locate the point of broadcast. The system was line of sight only so you had to be higher than the typical reconnaissance missions in search of enemy ships. Even if one did pick it up (requiring some pretty fancy scanning equipment to lock into that one descrete frequency) all one would hear would be a repetition of a single letter that change to another letter as you flew into the next broadcast sector. That would not tell you a thing about which way to go. Short answer, no, the Japanese did not back track on the YE-ZB to find US carriers.
On the other hand, the Japanese turned on all the lights to recover their errant strike on the the night of 7 May 1942, long before Mitscher was credited with doing so off the Marianas. There were a couple of other instances, on both sides, prior to that as well. In the US Naval Aviation circles in which I grew up, Arleigh Burke, Mitscher's chief of staff and Gus Widhlem, his ops officer was most often credited with making that happen. The thinking was that there were probably no Japanese submarines in the area anyway.
Rich
Last edited by R Leonard; June 9th, 2009 at 12:25 AM. Reason: crappy finger work on keys
My father was a carrier pilot in WW II, serving from 1941 until 1946 in the Pacific.
我的父亲是二战航母飞行员，从1941年在太平洋地区，一直到1946年。 福籁翻译，
本人水平有限,
期待 E 文达人加入
舞台属于您......
2009-4-14
原作者 Devilsadvocate：
My father was a carrier pilot in WW II, serving from 1941 until 1946 in the Pacific.
我的父亲是二战航母飞行员，从1941年在太平洋地区，一直到1946年。
He flew SBD's in 1942, was a flight instructor in the States for most of 1943, and returned to the Pacific flying F6F's from 1944 to 1946.
他在1942年SBD的飞的，是为1943年在美国最多飞行教官，并返回到太平洋的飞行从1944年F6F的至1946年。
Over-water navigation was always one of the most difficult challenges that Navy pilots faced.
海上导航总是海军飞行员面对的最困难的挑战之一。
Combined with weather which might change rapidly, navigational errors probably killed as many naval pilots as did the enemy.
导航错误与随时可能迅速变化天气相结合，和敌人一样夺走了海军飞行员的生命。
When flying from carriers, pilots were briefed on what courses to fly both outbound and inbound, and were advised of a "Point Option", which was the location the carrier expected to be at the time the pilots returned from their mission.
当从航空母舰起飞时，简报向飞行员们介绍了升空航向和归航航向，同时建议了一个“着陆点选项”，这是将在飞行员的完成任务返回时航空母舰的预期位置。
Things sometimes happened to cause the carrier to alter it's plans and in that case it wouldn't be at "Point Option".
事情有时候发生变化导致航空母舰改变它的计划，并在此情况下，它不会到达在“着陆点选项”。
In that case, the pilot had two options; conduct a search for the carrier with what fuel it had remaining, or hope to pick up the homing beacon each carrier operated.
在这种情况下，飞行员有两个选择，在剩余燃油的情况下开始对航母的搜索，或者希望能够截获每艘航母舰载工作导航信标台。
All US carriers were equipped at the start of the war with a device called the YE-ZB.
美国所有航空母舰均在战争开始时装备了导航设备称为YE-ZB型。
This was a UHF (line of sight) transmitter which transmitted a Morse code letter denoting 15 degrees of a circle.
这是一个UHF 超高频（line of sight）发射机，它发射了莫尔斯电码 指示了圆周15度的信号。
If the pilot picked up a Morse "M" for instance and homed on it, then sarted picking up another letter, he would know he was
moving an a tangential course in relation to the carrier; he would then turn and home on the strongest signal.
如果飞行员截获莫尔斯代码“M”立即就转向航向，然后开始截获另一字母中，他知道现在自己的航向正和航母是在一个切线上，他会转向直到截获最强信号航向。
Since this was a UHF device it worked better at higher altitudes.
由于这是一个UHF 超高频设备，高度越高工作效果越好。
It wasn't extremely reliable and some pilots were better at using it than others, so pilots had differing levels of confidence in it.
这不是非常可靠，一些飞行员在使用它时效果比别人更好，所以不同飞行员对此设备有不同的信赖程度。
Planes with multiple crew members, like SBD's and TBM's had an advantage in that the pilot could cconcentrate on flying while a crew member was delegated to attend to navigation.
有多名飞行员机组的飞机例如 SBD和 TBM的，在导航上有优势，因为飞行员可以专注于飞行，并且可以委派另一名飞行员专注导航。
Fighter pilots, of course, were most likely to become a victim of faulty navigation because they were by themselves, and air combat with enemy fighters would often cause them to become disoriented as to their location.
战斗机飞行员，当然，最有可能成为自己错误导航的受害者，而空中和敌机的战斗，往往会导致他们迷失方向以及他们的位置。
My father once said he felt that perhaps as many as a quarter of all losses of carrier aircraft were due to the pilot
becoming lost, but this, I think, was just a guess.
我父亲曾经说过，他觉得也许多达四分之一的舰载机飞行员损失是由于飞行员迷航导致的，但这个，我想，只是一个猜测。
In some exceptional cases, like Mitscher's command at the Battle of Philippine Sea, carriers might display lights at night to help lost pilots.
在某些特殊情况下，如Mitscher 米茨彻的位于菲律宾海作战指挥，航空母舰可能会在夜间开启航向灯，以帮助迷航的飞行员。
In fact, Mitscher's task Groups not only displayed lights, they directed search lights straight upward, fired star shells, and turned on all deck lights on all ships, escorts included.
事实上，Mitscher 米茨彻的航母群不仅开启航向灯，它们打开垂直朝天的探照灯，发射信号弹，所有船只打开甲板上灯光，包括护航舰队在内。
This confused at least some of the returning pilots, at least one of whom made a landing approach on a destroyer.
这严重地混淆返回一些飞行员，至少有一个人就一艘驱逐舰着陆进近。 福籁翻译 了Devilsadvocate 的帖子
本人水平有限,
期待E 文达人加入 接着翻译 Rich的言论，谢谢！
舞台属于您。 F16CJ 提供资料
at least one of whom made a landing approach on a destroyer.
这严重地混淆返回一些飞行员，至少有一个人就一艘驱逐舰着陆进近。
这个翻译是没错，但和实际不符合
实际上应该是有飞行员在驱逐舰旁边迫降
谢谢！
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